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
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616	%10.9 %50 %28.7 %10.4	67 308 177 64	30 40-31 50-41 51	
616	%74.8 %25.2	461 155		

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	2	1.00	3.45		.37
	3	1.04	3.44		.39
	4	1.02	3.41		.40
	5	0.97	3.40		.36
	6	0.99	3.40		.41
	7	1.01	3.36		.34
	8	0.98	3.30		.35
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(1.02) (3.23) ((5)

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	1	0.82	4.29		9-8
	2	0.95	3.92		14-12
	3	0.96	3.85		7-6
	4	0.94	3.83		-11-10
	-	0.53	3,97		14-6

(0.95) (3.92) (6)

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	1	0.97	3.93		16-15
	2	0.96	3.92		25-24
	3	0.98	3.73		18-17
	4	0.93	3.61		21-19
	5	0.99	3.60		23-22
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	1	0.84	4.00		33-31
	2	0.96	3.88		27-26
	3	0.92	3.85		30-28
	-	0.51	3.91		33-26

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:
 (Multicollinearity)
 (Variance Inflation Factor)(VIF) (0.84) (4.00)
 (Tolerance)
 (3.88)
 (10) (VIF) (0.96)
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 (Skewness) :
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:(9)

Skewness	Tolerance	VIF		
0.625	0.416	2.403		
0.624	0.445	2.246		
0.616	0.313	3.192		
0.781	0.373	2.680		
0.786	0.293	3.410		
0.789	0.325	3.075		
0.489	0.284	3.519		
0.501	0.329	3.041		
0.370	0.313	1.404		
0.210	0.464	2.156		
0.266	0.561	1.314		
0.337	0.463	2.160		

(VIF)
 (1) (Skewness) (1.314 -3.519) 10
 . (Tolerance)
 (10) (0.05) (0.284 -0.561)
 (F)
 (10) ($\alpha \leq 0.01$) (Multicollinearity)

() (%66.1)
()
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(%67.9)

(Analysis Of variance) : (10)

F	F	F	R ²		
13.501	0.000	*189.65	0.661	(611 4)	
9.037	0.000	*224.36	0.705	(610 5)	
26.163	0.000	*194.58	0.679	(612 3)	

($\alpha \leq 0.01$)

*

(t)

3.434 4.816 5.176)

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(7.665

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($\alpha \leq 0.01$)

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(2,586)

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t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*5.176	0.237	0.041	0.210	
0.000	*4.816	0.215	0.045	0.216	
0.001	*3.434	0.153	0.044	0.151	
0.000	*7.665	0.350	0.041	0.315	

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

*

Stepwise Multiple Regression

(%63.6) (%58.7))
 ((%65.1)
 (%66.1) (12)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression" : (12)

*t	t	R ²	
0.000	*9.307	0.587	
0.000	*6.548	0.636	
0.000	*5.680	0.651	
0.000	*5.352	0.661	

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

*

(t) :

(6.442 3.112 7.120 5.617 4.691)) ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(1,965) (

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) ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) (13)

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(

(13):

t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*4.691	0.191	0.040	0.191	
0.000	*5.617	0.264	0.069	0.221	
0.000	*7.120	0.388	0.033	0.435	
0.002	*3.112	0.169	0.068	0.211	
0.000	*6.442	0.356	0.063	0.408	

 $(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

*

(%55.6)

Stepwise Multiple Regression

(%60.4)

)

(%64)

(

(%68.6)

(14)

(%70.4)

.

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

(14):

*t	t	R ²	
0.000	*12.423	0.556	
0.000	*10.290	0.604	
0.000	*9.914	0.640	
0.000	*6.978	0.686	
0.000	*4.216	0.704	

 $(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

*

(Beta) :

(t) ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(6.184 8.606 10.414))

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

:(1,965) (

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) (15) .

) (t) (Beta)

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:(15)

t	t	Beta		B	
0.000	*10.414	0.557	0.065	0.571	
0.000	*8.606	0.393	0.055	0.467	
0.000	*6.184	0.289	0.074	0.385	

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

*

(%63.5)

Stepwise Multiple Regression

)

(%63.5)

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(%67.7)

(16)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

:(16)

T	T	R ²	
0.000	*4.301	0.635	
0.000	*3.556	0.668	
0.000	*3.459	0.677	

($\alpha \leq 0.01$)

*

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(17)

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	(F)				
0.724	0.516	0.736	1	0.736	
0.000	*4.287	2.74	2	5.476	
0.007	*3.567	1.251	4	5.004	
0.206	1.57	0.58	3	1.73	
0.461	1.14	1.35	1	1.35	
		0.37	604	226.27	
			615	240.57	

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

(F) *

(F=4.287)

(17)

($\alpha = 0.000$)

()

($0.05 \leq \alpha$)

(F=0.516)

($\alpha = 0.724$)

($0.05 \leq \alpha$)

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(4)

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*0.22	-	-	3.29	
*0.12	-	-	3.39	
-	-	-	3.51	

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(3.53) (21)
(3.27) (5) ()
(21) (F=3.567)

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(%11,4) " ($\alpha = 0.007$)
(4) (0.05 $\geq \alpha$)

(19)

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:(19)

21	20-16	15-11	10-6	5		
*0.26	-	-	-	-	3.27	5
-	-	-	-	-	3.32	10-6
-	-	-	-	-	3.38	15-11
-	-	-	-	-	3.43	20-16
-	-	-	-	-	3.53	21

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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((F=1.57)
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		()
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)	($\alpha \leq 0.05$)	(3.76)
		.(0.58)
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

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The Effect of Moral, Psychological and Social Factors on the Level of Tax Compliance from the Point of View of Income Tax Assessors in Jordan

*Khalid Al-Zou'bi **

ABSTRACT

This study aims at investigating the effect of moral, psychological, and social factors on the level of income tax compliance in Jordan as seen by income tax assessors. The study incorporated all income tax assessors (675) in all 10 districts of the Kingdom -excluding Aqaba. A questionnaire of (42) items has been developed and distributed to them. The researcher received back (616) of them, about %91.3 of the whole study population. The study questions and propositions were tested employing the SPSS.V16 pack, using Descriptive Statistic Measure, Percentages, Means, Standard Deviations, Analyses of Variance of Regression, Variance Analysis, and Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis. The study came to the following conclusions:

1. The income tax assessors' estimations of the level of income tax compliance were average with a mean of 3.38 and a standard deviation of 0.63.
2. There is a statistically significant effect (at $\alpha < 0.05$) of the psychological factors (frankness, integrity, honesty, and commitment to moral codes) on the level of tax compliance.
3. There is a statistically significant effect (at $\alpha < 0.05$) of the psychological factors (timidity, positive consideration of tax, feeling the fairness of distribution, duty to country, and feelings of guilt) on the level of tax compliance.
4. There is a statistically significant effect (at $\alpha < 0.05$) of the social factors (feelings of responsibility towards community, community's bad impression of those who evade paying taxes, appreciation of social standards) on the level of tax compliance.
5. Also, the study found statistically significant differences (at $\alpha < 0.05$) in the understandings of the participants in the study (the sample) of tax compliance due to practical experience for the benefit of 21-year-old and more group, and to the level of education to the benefit of holders of high degrees.

The study stressed the importance of enhancing moral principles and increasing awareness of taxpayers of the importance of compliance, and announcing names of those who evade payment in the media.

KEYWORDS: Tax Compliance, Moral, Psychological and Social Factors, Tax Income.